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Provincial and local (hereafter “local”) governments in China play an important role
in the overall economy. To begin with, local budgetary revenue in recent years is around
8% of GDP, extra-budgetary revenue (largely income from land) comes to another 3% of
GDP, budgetary expenditures are close to 14% of GDP, and extra-budgetary expenditures
adds another 2.5% of GDP (see Table 1). This scale of activity is broadly comparable to
that of state and local governments in the United States, where own tax revenue is around
13% of GDP and expenditures are 16% of GDP. Local governments in both settings have
primary responsibility for education, local infrastructure, and local public services.
The similarity largely stops there, however. In the United States, local governments are
mainly ﬁnanced by property taxes and user fees, and state governments by a combination
of personal income taxes and sales taxes. In China, until 1994, local governments were
mainly ﬁnanced through a tax on the proﬁts and sales of non-state ﬁrms. Since then,
they have received a fraction of the VAT and corporate proﬁts tax collected in their
jurisdictions, and all the revenue from personal income taxes, business taxes, and (until
recently) taxes on agriculture.1
Chinese local governments also play a much more central role in the local economy
than do local governments in the United States, controlling the allocation of land, and
in the past, exercising substantial controls over the allocation of bank credit. The initial
growth in China at the beginning of the economic reforms in fact is largely attributed to
the initiative of local governments in setting up township and village enterprises (TVEs)
and other non-state ﬁrms (Gordon and Li, 2005).
∗We would like to express our gratitude for the comments and suggestions that we received from Joseph
Fan, Alex Gelber, Hua Li, Zhigang Li, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung and participants at presentations
at Tsinghua University, the NBER pre-conference in Cambridge, MA, and the NBER-CUHK conference
in Hong Kong on “Capitalizing China.” We would like to thank CKGSB for its hospitality and ﬁnancial
support.
1See Gordon and Li (2005) and Hussain and Stern (2008) for more discussions on the evolving public
ﬁnance in China.
1Oversight over local government in China is also far diﬀerent than in the United
States. In the United States, oversight occurs through both voice and exit. Local oﬃcials
are elected by residents, so they can be removed from oﬃce if residents are not satisﬁed
with outcomes. In addition, local residents can vote with their feet and leave a poorly per-
forming jurisdiction, putting pressure on local oﬃcials to keep current residents satisﬁed.
In China, by contrast, neither voice nor exit plays a major role in aﬀecting the incentives
faced by local oﬃcials. There are no local elections above the village level,2 so oﬃcials
face no threat of being voted out of oﬃce.3 The threat of exit is also constrained, since
Chinese are subject to the hukou system, a registration system that ties individuals to
their current location. In addition, farmers are tied to their land, since there is not a well
functioning market for selling or leasing this land, due to their lack of legal ownership of
the land.
If neither voice nor exit serve to provide incentives to local oﬃcials in China, what
does aﬀect their incentives? Oversight from the central government certainly plays an
important role, as emphasized by Xu (2010). Local oﬃcials are appointed by higher levels
of government and are evaluated by the central government based on a range of criteria.
The central government also mandates that certain intergovernmental transfers from the
central government be matched by provincial and local funds and then be used for speciﬁc
purposes, e.g. education and health care, which constrains the choices of local oﬃcials.
In practice, though, local oﬃcials still have substantial discretion. For example, even
if monetary expenditures on particular tasks can be monitored, it is diﬃcult to monitor
the quality of the resulting services. The country is large, and the resources available to
the central government to oversee subnational governments are very limited. Even when
oversight exists, the eﬀects of this oversight on the chance of promotion (or demotion)
of local oﬃcials carries much weight only for the very best and very worst oﬃcials, as
judged by the observed criteria, since most oﬃcials are neither promoted nor demoted. In
addition, mandated use of funds, or explicit standards of performance, have the drawback
that these standards may not be well suited for many jurisdictions, given the tremendous
variation in conditions over a large and diverse country. The information used in making
these decisions can also be manipulated by local oﬃcials, undermining the eﬀectiveness of
these incentives.
In practice, therefore, the quality of the remaining incentives faced by local oﬃcials
inevitably plays an important role. How well designed are these incentives? The better
these incentives are designed, the greater the decentralization of decision-making that can
2Since the 1980s, villagers have been allowed to experiment with various forms of self-government,
often by electing village management committees, to ﬁll the vacuum left after the demise of the People’s
Communes (O’Brien and Li, 2000). In 1998, village elections and village self-government were codiﬁed into
law. However, elected village oﬃcials often enjoyed little ﬁscal autonomy. Democratic choice of oﬃcials
has not to date been extended to higher levels of government.
3In the oﬃcial hierarchy in China, village oﬃcials are not considered government cadres, even though
they are often on the government payroll.
2comfortably be undertaken. The focus of this paper is then on the range of incentives
faced by oﬃcials beyond direct oversight from the central government.
Our key hypothesis is that the welfare of local oﬃcials is heavily dependent on the
amount of government revenue collected in their jurisdiction, minus the amounts they
need to spend to provide services to local residents. These residual ﬁscal proﬁts are under
the control of local oﬃcials and can easily be used for their personal beneﬁt. The size of
these residual proﬁts is aﬀected by the allocation choices made by local oﬃcials, so they
implicitly serve as an incentive contract. If local revenue depends on the proﬁts of local
ﬁrms, for example, then oﬃcials have a personal incentive to increase these proﬁts.
Given existing tax structures and existing sources of extra-budgetary revenue, what
economic incentives do local oﬃcials face? What economic choices would local oﬃcials
then be expected to make, given these incentives? When incentives have changed over
time, what changes in behavior would we expect to see? What are the key sources of
ineﬃciency in the allocation of resources by local government forecast based on existing
ﬁnancial incentives? What would be the forecasted eﬀect of possible ﬁscal reforms on the
eﬃciency of the allocation decisions made by local oﬃcials?
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 summarizes brieﬂy the role of
voice and exit in aﬀecting the incentives faced by local oﬃcials in the United States, as
explored in the past academic literature. Section 2 develops an alternative model in which
the incentives faced by oﬃcials depend on the tax revenue they receive minus whatever
they need to spend on local public services. We develop this model using the institutions
that have existed in China during the reform period. In section 3, we then examine how
these incentives changed over the course of the reform period, as the tax law changed and
as market reforms were introduced. Section 4 then examines the additional incentives
faced by oﬃcials due to national government control over their possible promotion or
demotion. Section 5 considers how a range of policy reforms would aﬀect the incentives
faced by local oﬃcials, and section 6 provides a brief summary.
1 Traditional models of government oversight
We begin with a summary of the U.S. literature on the forms of oversight of local oﬃcials,
and why on paper we would then expect to see oﬃcials making choices that are largely in
the best interests of residents.
One source of oversight is the election process. Each potential oﬃcial proposes a plat-
form to voters. Voters choose that candidate whose proposed platform provides them the
highest utility. If candidates simply care about being elected and voters are homogeneous,
then, in equilibrium, each candidate’s platform will maximize the utility of voters. In-
eﬃciencies can arise due to diﬀerences in the preferences of the median voter compared
with the overall costs versus beneﬁts of a project, as emphasized by Buchanan and Tullock
(1962). Candidates, though, have their own preferences, and can be inﬂuenced by special
3interests. They are not obliged to follow through on their campaign promises. Voters also
face a free rider problem, having no personal incentive to vote or to be informed about the
candidates. The quality of oversight through the voting process is therefore uncertain on
net. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2006), for example, ﬁnd in India that voters provide surprisingly
poor oversight over oﬃcials.
More central to the literature on ﬁscal federalism is the Tiebout model. Under this
model, oﬃcials propose a tax structure and spending package and gain utility from any tax
revenue left after ﬁnancing promised expenditures.4 Residents then choose where to live
and ﬁrms where to locate, with land prices adjusting to generate an equilibrium residential
allocation. Competition among communities, if suﬃciently intense, pushes net ﬁscal proﬁts
down to zero, induces oﬃcials to provide the package of public services residents are willing
to pay for, and forces them to ﬁnance these expenditures with user fees (or head taxes if
all residents beneﬁt equally from the spending) and to provide the services at minimum
cost. This competition is most intense if residents are costlessly mobile, if they can carry
their income with them, and if there are many competing communities. In equilibrium,
when competition is intense, ﬁscal outcomes should be eﬃcient.
Oﬃcials in China, though, are not subject to either voting pressures or much pressure
from the mobility of potential residents, given the hukou system. Even though people are
not mobile, however, economic activity is mobile: Local ﬁrms face intense competition
in the (inter)national economy. The aim of this paper is to make use of the Tiebout
framework to explore what outcomes would be expected when oﬃcials act to maximize
net ﬁscal proﬁts, as deﬁned based on the existing institutions in China, given that economic
activity, but not people, are mobile across jurisdictions.
2 Incentives created by the source of tax revenue: general
model
In this section, we focus on how the available sources of revenue aﬀect the incentives faced
by Chinese oﬃcials. Our setup follows the structure of the Tiebout model in that the
utility of oﬃcials depends on their net “ﬁscal proﬁts”: tax revenue, proﬁts from ﬁrms
owned by the local government, plus income generated by land rents minus expenditures
on public services.
We begin by laying out a general model with the following stylized institutional fea-
tures. With the hukou system in place, we assume that labor is not mobile across jurisdic-
tions (Wang and Zuo, 1999),5 but it can freely move between jobs within the jurisdiction.
We assume for now that capital cannot move across jurisdictions.6 Land is owned by the
4We will refer to government revenue minus expenditures as net ﬁscal proﬁts.
5Economic reforms have gradually increased labor mobility, an issue we discuss in Section 3.
6Economic reforms have relaxed control over the allocation of capital. In section 3, we presume local
government control over the allocation of capital until 1994 and market allocation after 1994.
4government. Farmers have been given use rights for their plots and must be compensated
if the government shifts this land to other uses. Use rights on other land can be allocated,
rented, or sold to ﬁrms and households for a ﬁnite number of years. In the next section,
we then relate these more general assumptions to the particular institutions that existed
during various time periods under the reforms in China.
Firms can be privately owned or owned by local governments.7 Privately-owned ﬁrms
in each industry i located in the jurisdiction face a tax at rate τi on their proﬁts, denoted
πi, an excise tax at rate si on their sales, plus an implicit tax denoted by κi on their
capital. Here, πi = pi(1 − si)Qi − wLi − (r + κi)Ki − niAi − uiG, where pi is the output
price (which the jurisdiction takes as given), Qi = Qi(Li,Ki,Ai;G,R) is local output
produced in industry i using labor (Li), domestic capital (Ki), and land (Ai), with local
infrastructure G aiding production and local regulations R aﬀecting productivity. Here,
w is the local wage rate, r is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to the ﬁrm (set
nationally), and ni is the implicit rent the government charges industry for use of land,
while ui is a fee (if any) charged for use of G, which at most equals the marginal product
of G. Depending on the time period, oﬃcials may control the allocation of domestic
capital across local ﬁrms through their oversight of the local banks. Not only do tax rates
diﬀer by industry, but they also may diﬀer by type of ﬁrm, with the national government
receiving all the revenue from state-owned ﬁrms that it controlled, but local governments
at times receiving all the tax revenue from both private ﬁrms and ﬁrms set up by the local
government.
For government-owned ﬁrms, the government receives not only the tax revenue from
the ﬁrms, but also the after-tax proﬁts, (1 − τj)πj. In total, it therefore simply receives
the entire pre-tax proﬁts from these ﬁrms. We assume that the government has designed
the incentives faced by ﬁrm managers so that they make allocation decisions to maximize
the government’s objective function.
Depending on the time period, oﬃcials may also receive revenue from agriculture, both
through explicit taxes and through requiring farmers to sell output to the government at
a below-market price. Assume for simplicity that the tax revenue from agriculture equals
σpfF, where σ is the implicit tax rate, pf is the market price for agricultural output, and
F is the quantity produced, with F = F(Lf,Kf,Af;Gf,Rf). Here, Gf is another set of
public services aimed at agriculture, provided at a user charge of uf, while Rf represents
regulations aﬀecting agriculture.
Farmers have use rights for an area of land A0
f without paying explicit rent. If oﬃcials
reallocate some of this land to industrial or residential uses, they must compensate farmers
by paying them the marginal product of land used in agriculture, an amount we denote
by c ≡ (1−σ)pfFA, where FA = ∂F/∂Af is the marginal product of land.8 Similarly, the
wage rate ﬁrms must pay to attract local workers satisﬁes w ≡ (1 − σ)pfFL. To simplify
7In this analysis, we ignore ﬁrms owned by the national government, since allocations to these ﬁrms
are largely controlled by the national government. For simplicity, we also ignore foreign subsidiaries.
8Throughout, we use subscripts of a function to denote partial derivatives.
5the subsequent notation, assume that all units of output are redeﬁned so that pi = pf = 1.
The government provides services to each household, Gh, which the household in part
pays for through a user fee uh. Let nh denote the rent received per unit of land Ah
allocated to housing. Market-clearing rents can be expressed by nh = q(Ah,w
P
i Li),
where q is decreasing in Ah and increasing in the income of workers.
For simplicity, we start by assuming a ﬁxed total supply of each factor to the jurisdic-
tion, e.g.,
P
i Ai + Af + Ah = AT, where the superscript T signiﬁes the total amount of
a factor available in the jurisdiction. Given the lack of mobility, total factor supplies are
clearly ﬁxed for labor and land. For the moment, we assume that the supply of capital to
the jurisdiction is ﬁxed as well, based on the deposits under the control of local banks. We
also assume that factors are fully employed, so for any given allocation of factors to indus-







Assume that ﬁrms with i ∈ IP are privately owned while ﬁrms with j ∈ IG are owned
by the government. The objective of oﬃcials is to maximize the sum of tax revenue from
privately owned ﬁrms, proﬁts from government-owned ﬁrms, agricultural taxes, and land
rents, minus compensation to farmers and minus the net cost (net of user fees) of public
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ui) − Gf(1 − uf) − NTGh(1 − uh) − e(R) − ef(Rf) (2.1)
Here, NT is the size of the local population. Oﬃcials then allocate land and capital and
choose how much to spend on each form of public service to maximize expression (2.1).
Local wage rates and labor allocation are determined by the local labor market.
We assume that oﬃcials maximize this expression over the time period they are in
oﬃce, so that each expression implicitly reﬂects the present value of taxes and expenditures
during this time period, and A0
f measures the amount of land used by farmers when the
oﬃcial takes oﬃce. Decisions clearly are aﬀected by the oﬃcial’s time horizon, since some
eﬀects of policy changes show up quickly whereas other eﬀects may materialize only after
the oﬃcial leaves oﬃce.10 We also ignore any agency problems that may exist within
the local government, and assume that all decisions are based on the above objective.11
Another apparent omission is side payments from ﬁrms or individuals that aim to change
9For simplicity, we assume that Gand Gf are local public goods, so that costs or quality of service do
not depend on the number of users.
10If the oﬃcial can “sell” his position to his successor, though, then the price paid can capture these
future eﬀects of policy changes, implicitly giving oﬃcials a longer time horizon.
11Since an oﬃcial may be removed from oﬃce if those reporting to him are unhappy with his performance,
an oﬃcial faces a strong incentive to align his interests with those of others in the local government.
6government decision. As argued by Grossman and Helpman (1994), such side payments
would ideally be designed so that oﬃcials take full account of how their decisions aﬀect
the proﬁts/utility of the ﬁrm/individual paying the bribe. If a private ﬁrm makes such
payments, for example, then the oﬃcial would take into account the eﬀects of any decision
on the ﬁrm’s pre-tax proﬁts, as is the case for ﬁrms owned by the local government.12
What decisions are then forecast, given this objective function for local oﬃcials? Con-




L = w + σFL − qLAh − (1 − σ)FAL(A0
f − Af), (2.2)
where the subscripts in Qj and F denote ﬁrst-order and second-order partial derivatives
with respect to capital, labor, and/or land.13 With full employment as assumed, the extra
labor allocated to industries has to be taken from agriculture, raising the marginal cost
of labor to the government by an amount equal to the foregone agricultural tax revenue
σFL. In addition, extra industrial workers lead to greater rental income from residential
housing, and lower compensation payments to farmers due to any drop in the value of
land when farmed less intensively.
Note that managers of these ﬁrms, if they instead made hiring decisions to maximize
after-tax ﬁrm proﬁts, would seek a labor force satisfying Q
j
L = w/(1 − sj). Local gov-
ernments have ﬁnancial incentives to force managers of government-owned ﬁrms to hire
more workers than they would otherwise choose to as long as w + σFL − qLAh − (1 −
σ)FAL(A0
f −Af) < w/(1−sj). This condition holds as long as sj > σ. In this case, excise
taxes unduly discourage employment in government-owned ﬁrms relative to agriculture,
while extra government employment provides various added beneﬁts to the government’s
budget. Managers of government-owned ﬁrms certainly claim that they are forced to
employ many more workers than they would wish to.
Consider next the allocation of domestic capital to government-owned ﬁrms in industry
j. The ﬁrst order condition satisﬁes
Q
j
K = r + σFK − (1 − σ)FAK(A0
f − Af), (2.3)
Given the local resource constraint, the extra capital can be viewed as coming from agri-
culture. Now r is paid by the government rather than by farmers, introducing one cost.
The next term reﬂects the foregone tax revenue from agriculture due to the drop in capital
there. The ﬁnal term measures the gain due to the fall in land values in agriculture from
12Private ﬁrms were at times referred to as “wearing a red hat,” perhaps reﬂecting the fact that side
payments existed so that local oﬃcials treated these ﬁrms equivalently to government-owned ﬁrms.
13In general, wage rates can adjust. For simplicity here and later, we ignore changes in wage rates, on
the grounds that there has been enough surplus labor in agriculture that any such changes are too small
to matter.
7the drop in use of capital there, resulting in less compensation being paid to farmers for
any land shifted out of agriculture to industry.
Eﬃcient allocation of capital requires that Q
j
K = FK. In contrast, we conclude that
Q
j
K < FK, implying too much investment in industry than in agriculture on eﬃciency
grounds, as long as r is small and σ < 1.
Note that investment in agriculture increases when σ increases. With a higher tax
rate, the beneﬁts to the government of investment in the sector rise, leading to additional
investment. This counter intuitive result arises because the government is making alloca-
tion decisions based on the implications for tax revenue, rather than having farmers make
the decision based on implications for their after-tax proﬁts.
Consider next the allocation of domestic capital to private ﬁrms. Compared to allocat-
ing capital to government-owned ﬁrms, there are two disadvantages to allocating capital
to private ﬁrms. First, private ﬁrms hire fewer workers than the government would like
them to, since their hiring decisions are characterized by Qi
L = w/(1 − si), rather than
by equation (2.2). To that extent, private ﬁrms make less eﬀective use of extra capital.
In addition, the government receives only a fraction of the resulting marginal product of
capital equal to Ti ≡ si + τi(1 − si)< 1. For both reasons, the required marginal product
on capital allocated to private ﬁrms must be higher to compensate for these two oﬀsetting
disadvantages to private allocations.
Turn now to the allocation of land for industrial and residential uses. The ﬁrst-order
condition for land allocated to government-owned ﬁrms is
Q
j
A = FA − (1 − σ)FAA(A0
f − Af) (2.4)
By shifting an extra unit of agricultural land to industrial use, the government pays
(1 − σ)FA to farmers as compensation and bears a fall in agricultural revenue by an
amount σFA, for a combined opportunity cost of FA. Allocations are eﬃcient if there are
no further considerations, so that Q
j
A = FA. However, leaving less land in agriculture
raises its marginal product, so the government needs to provide more compensation to
farmers by an amount −(1 − σ)FAA(A0
f − Af). While this oﬀsetting eﬀect slows the
reallocation of land from agriculture to industry, leading to higher interim values for land
in industry than in agriculture, each generation of oﬃcial inherits a lower A0
f and will
choose to make further land reallocations as long as Qi
A > FA. This reallocation continues
until oﬃcials take oﬃce inheriting a value of A0
f equal to the allocation they ﬁnd optimal.
At this optimal allocation, we ﬁnd that Q
j
A = FA. After enough turnover of oﬃcials,
we can expect land to be allocated eﬃciently between agriculture and government-owned
ﬁrms.
Note, however, that each generation of oﬃcials acts in its own self-interest, ignoring the
eﬀects of its sales on the welfare of other generations of oﬃcials. If these diﬀerent genera-
tions of oﬃcials could collude, acting as if there were one oﬃcial in oﬃce indeﬁnitely, then
as a group they would take into account the eﬀects of land sales on the compensation paid
8to farmers on all land ever taken out of agriculture, and not just on the land removed from
agriculture while that one oﬃcial is in oﬃce. With such collusion, the sales price would
be permanently higher for non-agricultural land than for agricultural land. Interestingly,
the central government has a policy to preserve at least 1.8 billion mu of agricultural land,
ostensibly because of concerns over food security.14 An alternative motivation could be
that this national policy serves as a means of collusion among diﬀerent generations of
oﬃcials.
Consider now the ﬁrst-order condition that arises when oﬃcials consider reallocating




reasons. First, while the government receives rent on extra land allocated to private ﬁrms
equal to the resulting after-tax proﬁts and also receives the extra tax revenue, summing
to Qi
A, it suﬀers a loss due to the fall in equilibrium land rents: (1 − Ti)Qi
AAAi. The
government, being a monopoly supplier of land, therefore restricts land allocations to
private ﬁrms in order to drive up rents. Second, the private ﬁrm hires fewer extra workers
as a result of the extra land than would the government-owned ﬁrm, reducing further the
value of this land allocation.
For residential land, the government also acts as a monopoly supplier. It compares the
marginal revenue it receives to the same types of terms as above measuring the opportunity
cost of the land.
One implicit assumption in the above derivation is that oﬃcials compare the ﬂows of
rent in each use. In fact, they need to pay a lump-sum compensation to farmers reﬂecting
the present value of the land in agriculture when land is taken from agriculture. If the
trade-oﬀ that oﬃcials face is between this lump-sum payment to farmers and an increased
ﬂow of rents from industry during the limited time period the oﬃcial remains in power,
they would favor leaving land in agriculture. The land use policies and practice since the
late 1990s have instead allowed oﬃcials to sell rights to the land when it is reallocated
to industry. Oﬃcials therefore compare present values. The respective rents are then
divided by a discount rate, giving them much more weight in the above expressions. The
discount rates need not be the same, however. In particular, farmers face a harder time
acquiring funds, since farmland cannot be used as collateral, unlike industrial or residential
land. Farmers’ discount rate should therefore be higher, generating a factor favoring a
reallocation of land from agriculture to industry. In addition, once land has been sold,
changes in rents on this land no longer matter for future oﬃcials. In particular, the term
in equation (2.4) capturing changes in residential rents would now capture changes in rents
only on land still owned by the government and changes in value on residential land that
will be sold by that oﬃcial.
What about the choice of expenditures on public services? The choices made by
government oﬃcials, based on their own self-interest, would be eﬃcient only if local ﬁrms
14This policy imposes limits on the conversion of agricultural land within each jurisdiction, with oppor-
tunity costs that vary greatly by jurisdiction. If rights to develop agricultural land could be traded across
jurisdictions, these opportunity costs could be reduced.
9and individuals together are left unaﬀected on net by a marginal change in G.15 Any
beneﬁts to government-owned ﬁrms already go in their entirety to the government. The











(1 − τi)ui. (2.5)
Here, dLG measures the reallocation of agricultural labor into industry due to the marginal
increase in G, which, we presume, raises the marginal product of industrial labor.
Incentives on oﬃcials are therefore eﬃcient only if user fees fully reﬂect the direct net-
of-tax beneﬁts to private ﬁrms, farmers, and workers minus any losses they incur due to
changes in rents and in compensation payments to farmers. At least for roads with tolls, a
ﬁrm makes use of these roads to the point where (1−Ti)Qi
G = (1−τi)ui. Eﬃciency then
requires that the remaining terms on the left hand side of equation (2.5) equal zero. The
remaining terms all reﬂect losses to the private sector. Governments therefore have too
strong an incentive to provide these services and would be expected to provide subsidies
to the private ﬁrms that undertake these infrastructure investments.
Similarly, the choice of Gf yields an eﬃcient outcome only if the private sector is left
indiﬀerent at the margin to any marginal change in provision of public services. This
condition holds if







Gf − qLAhdLGf = uf. (2.6)
Gf raises the marginal product of agricultural labor and therefore causes a marginal
reallocation of industrial workers back into agriculture.16
For incentives on government oﬃcials to be eﬃcient, user fees must fully reﬂect the net-
of-tax beneﬁts to farmers from extra public services to agriculture, plus any net beneﬁts
farmers receive through increased compensation for land transferred out of agriculture,
plus the net beneﬁts the non-agricultural sector receives from lower rents on commercial
and residential property due to a migration of people back to agriculture. If farmers
make use of public services until marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs are equal, so that
15This condition on marginal incentives is suﬃcient if the second-order conditions are satisﬁed, e.g.,
decreasing returns to scale.
16The term dL
i
Gf in equation (2.6) denotes the marginal reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry
i. Since the reallocation is from industry i back into agriculture, dL
i
Gf < 0.
10(1−σ)FG = uf, then eﬃciency again requires that the remaining terms on the right hand
side of equation (2.6) sum to zero. All these terms reﬂect a net beneﬁt to the private
sector, implying that the private sector beneﬁts on net from additional expenditures on
public services to agriculture. The government, ignoring these beneﬁts, then provides too
few such services.
Expenditures on Gh are eﬃcient only if the dollar beneﬁts per household equal their
required user fee. In particular, education and health care services would be provided only
if costs are fully covered through user fees. This forecast is consistent with the claim we
have heard that education and health care have become “commodities” under the reforms,
and helps explain why the national government ﬁnds it hard to induce local governments
to provide these services for free to residents.
Finally, what can we say about regulatory policies? Again, decisions by government
oﬃcials are eﬃcient only if the private sector is left indiﬀerent at the margin to any changes
in regulation. As with public services, the private sector beneﬁts from any increase in after-
tax proﬁts, and is aﬀected by any changes in land rents that arise (directly or indirectly) in
response to these extra proﬁts. With no extra user fees, though, there is no oﬀsetting price
that can adjust so that the private sector can be left indiﬀerent on net. As a result, oﬃcials
face inadequate incentives to put eﬀort into industrial regulations beneﬁting private ﬁrms,
though they would face eﬃcient incentives if there were separate policies for government-
owned ﬁrms. For similar reasons, there are inadequate incentives to regulate agriculture
well.
While local governments in China control the allocation of land and did in past years
control the allocation of capital, they don’t control the allocation of labor. From their
perspective, too much labor ends up migrating to lightly taxed industries away from more
heavily taxed industries. As a result, local governments can potentially gain through
making use of any further instruments to shift production from lightly taxed to heavily
taxed industries. One such instrument is controls over trade between their jurisdiction and
the rest of China. In particular, each local government has an incentive to restrict imports
in heavily taxed industries and restrict exports in the most lightly taxed industries. By
shifting the composition of local production towards goods that are more heavily taxed,
government revenue in the jurisdiction increases. Largely, this increase comes at the
expense of government revenue in other jurisdictions, who lose export markets for their
most highly taxed goods and have a harder time buying elsewhere the most lightly taxed
commodities. National prices then fall for the more heavily taxed goods, and rise for the
more lightly taxed goods, weakening any further incentive to intervene to restrict trade.
These negative ﬁscal externalities result in an ineﬃcient choice of government policies
from the joint perspective of local governments, providing a motivation for the national
government to intervene to lessen these trade distortions. Consistent with these forecasts,
Young (2000) and Bai et al. (2004) report evidence that local governments restricted trade
patterns, leading to too many ﬁrms of too small scale in the heavily taxed industries.
113 Application of model to diﬀerent time periods
We next use this general model to forecast the behavior of government oﬃcials during
particular sub-periods under the reforms in China, and how it should have changed over
time.
3.1 1979-1994
The initial allocation of resources in 1979 favored heavy industries at the expense of
agriculture and industries that catered to consumer demands. The government collected
revenue with a turnover tax, the industrial and commerical tax, on state-owned ﬁrms, by
directly controlling the use of state-owned ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and by taking grain from peasants
and leaving them just enough for subsistence. Table 2 shows that between 1978 and the
early 1980s, government relied primarily on remitted proﬁts from state-owned ﬁrms and
revenue from the industrial and commercial tax for its revenue. To economize on the cost
of revenue collection, the government used price scissors to channel proﬁts and turnover
taxes (which were included in oﬃcial prices) to a few industries located in large cities.
Agricultural goods were priced the lowest, followed by raw materials, energy, industrial




2 ≥ ... ≥ p0
I ≥ p0
f ≡ 1, (3.1)
so the lower numbered industries are higher-proﬁt-margin consumer durables industries.
Here, the total number of industries is I, and the superscript 0 denotes planned prices.
The national government then used its control over the allocation of factors to produce
those goods demanded at these prices.
We can characterize the resulting allocation under central planning as a market allo-
cation subject to a set of excise taxe rates, with the highest tax rate on consumer durables
and the lowest on agriculture, suﬃcient to induce ﬁrms to produce those goods demanded
by consumers at the prices p0
i
As part of the initial reforms, local governments obtained control and cash ﬂow rights
for new ﬁrms they set up or sponsored as well as for existing small and medium-sized SOEs
and even some large SOEs. The local government not only received the tax payments from
these ﬁrms based on the newly introduced excise and proﬁts taxes, but also controlled the
use of the ﬁrms’ remaining after-tax proﬁts. As a result, the objective of local oﬃcials
was to maximize the sum of pre-tax proﬁts and land rents, minus the cost of public
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17At least initially, user fees were unusual.
12This objective is a special case of equation (2.1), but with no private ﬁrms and no
income from land.18 Since the excise taxes used to maintain the initial prices did not aﬀect
the allocation decisions of local oﬃcials, local governments faced undistorted incentives
but prevailing prices that diﬀered sharply from marginal costs. They therefore faced strong
incentives to shift production toward goods that had previously faced high implicit tax
rates. They were in an eﬀective position to do this, since local oﬃcials had control over
the allocation of existing bank credit among diﬀerent ﬁrms.19 While existing industrial
workers were guaranteed a planned wage rate, a labor market nonetheless arose since new
“contract” workers could be hired at a market wage rate (Gordon and Li, 1995).
What do these conditions imply for allocation decisions? The ﬁrst order conditions
with respect to capital and land satisfy
Q
j






Conditional on the initial prices, on eﬃciency grounds the allocation of factors within
industry should have been eﬃcient, though too much capital and land would be shifted
out of agriculture into industry, assuming that the interest rate has been set below the
market-clearing level. Since the initial prices were not market-clearing prices, however, the
resulting allocations led to surplus output in the industries with artiﬁcially high prices and
shortages in the industries with artiﬁcially low prices. The resulting competition among
local governments to gain market shares in high-margin industries led to over-capacity
and ineﬃciently small scales in those industries, exposing the incompatibility of pricing
under the plan with decentralized decision-making.
These growing surpluses and shortages quickly forced the national government to intro-
duce a dual-track pricing system, whereby a ﬁxed quantity, rationed among ﬁrms, must be
sold at the original prices, and all further output must be sold at market prices (Li, 1999).
With undistorted incentives on local governments and market prices for all marginal trans-
actions, allocation decisions within industry should indeed have been eﬃcient. Empirical
studies by Gordon and Li (1995), Groves et al. (1994), and Li (1997) conﬁrm the eﬃciency
enhancing impact of the reform in the 1980s. It was also documented in Li (1997) that,
between 1980 and 1989, more investment did ﬂow to industries that had higher combined
taxes and (after-tax) proﬁts per yuan of sales and that product market competition among
enterprises did bring about marked improvements in total factor productivity. Competi-
tion, however, signiﬁcant reduced state-owned ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Table 2 shows signiﬁcantly
smaller remitted proﬁts and the presence of large subsidies to cover state-owned ﬁrms’
losses in the late 1980s.
18Residential housing was provided by each ﬁrm for its employees rather than being rented from the
local government.
19We assume that so little land could yet proﬁtably be used in industry that A
0
f ≈ Af.
13However, given that σ < 1, there would be too little land allocated to agriculture.
With r t 0, there would also be too little capital investment in agriculture, as is apparent
in the data. Figure 1 shows that the share of capital construction investment allocated
to agriculture started from a small 4.5% in 1980 and declined steadily to less than 1% in
1994. By comparison, the share of capital contruction investment allocated to industry
remained above 60% between 1985 and 1994.
In spite of an unclear legal environment, some private ﬁrms did enter during this
period; see Figure 3 for evidence of a rising share of industrial output produced by non-
state ﬁrms between 1980 and 1993. However, since local governments could keep only
the tax revenue from private ﬁrms, there would be underinvestment and potentially even
no land allocated to private ﬁrms, unless private ﬁrms provided side payments to local
oﬃcials (implemented perhaps by registering ﬁrms as collectives), to compensate for any
lost proﬁts from government-owned ﬁrms.
What about public expenditures? First, without (much of) a private sector and no
land rents, there are no marginal eﬀects on the private sector of any changes in public
services to industry, so government incentives lead to eﬃcient outcomes for G as long as
changes in wage rates can be ignored. Agriculture would beneﬁt directly from extra ser-
vices to agriculture, but without user fees, oﬃcials have no reason to take these beneﬁts
into account, leading to inadequate incentives to provide Gf. Without user fees, there are
no incentives to provide Gh to households. Table 4 shows that shares of budgetary ex-
penditures on programs that support agriculture, education, scientiﬁc research, and social
subsidies fell between 1991 (the ﬁrst year we have available data) and 1993, while shares of
budgetary expenditures on capital construction and services to industry, communications,
and distribution held steady. Extra-budgetary expenditures, if the data were available,
would likely be even more biased toward capital contruction than budgetary expenditures.
Finally, what about regulatory policies? With full control over the entire return to
improvements in industrial productivity, oﬃcials should have invested the eﬃcient level of
eﬀort in designing eﬀective regulations for industry. Sharing less in productivity gains in
agriculture, they would have invested less eﬀort there. Data in Table 4 on ﬁscal support
from local governments for agriculture and non-agricultural sectors are consistent with
this prediction.
In sum, the reforms starting in the early 1980s oﬀered local oﬃcials strong incentives for
industrial development. These incentives encouraged oﬃcials to pour resources into sectors
that the planners had previously restricted. Our model forecasts an eﬃcient allocation of
factors within industry, but an excessive shift of capital and land out of agriculture.
3.2 Post-1994
The Chinese government implemented extensive economic reforms around 1994, with many
further gradual changes since then. Our stylized summary of the institutions since 1994
are as follows:
14The dual track system was phased out by the mid-1990s. Planned prices were largely
eliminated. This shift in infra-marginal rents, though, didn’t change marginal incentives
so shouldn’t have aﬀected market allocations.
Restrictions on the entry and growth of private ﬁrms were substantially eased, resulting
in a rapid growth of the private sector (Figure 3). The allocation of factors between
private and government-owned ﬁrms now becomes a serious choice, making details of the
tax system an important issue.
The formal tax structure changed dramatically in 1994. Excise taxes with rates that
varied by industry were replaced by: 1) a VAT on mining and manufacturing industries
at a uniform rate of 17%, with local governments receiving 25% of the resulting revenue
collected from ﬁrms in the jurisdiction;20 2) a business tax (an excise tax on service in-
dustries), with the revenue going entirely to local governments; and 3) an excise tax on
luxury goods and goods with consumption externalities paid to the national government.
In addition, the statutory corporate income tax rate fell from 55% to 33%. The national
government received the corporate income taxes paid by ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁrms
controlled directly by the national government, while local governments received the cor-
porate taxes paid by local ﬁrms.21 A personal income tax was created, with revenues going
entirely to local governments. In addition, the national government took control over the
administration of the taxes on ﬁrms, largely eliminating the ability of local governments
to hide the tax liabilities of local ﬁrms from the national government.
The impact of this change in tax structure on the share of budgetary revenue between
national and local governments is apparent in Table 1. From 1993 to 1994, the budgetary
revenue of the national government rose from 2.7% of GDP to 6%, while the budgetary
revenue of local governments fell from 9.6% to 4.8%. And in 1994, Table 2 shows that
state-owned ﬁrms stopped remitting proﬁts to governments. In Table 3, we report tax
revenues collected relative to GDP under the new tax regime. The VAT, business tax,
and the corporate income tax accounted for most of the revenues. Personal income taxes
also rose quickly to become the fourth largest revenue source. Tax revenue rose steadily
between 1995 and 2007.
These various tax reforms should have had only limited eﬀects on the incentives faced
by local oﬃcials when allocating factors to government-owned ﬁrms: The only change is
that the national government now collects some VAT revenue from these ﬁrms, so the
local government does not receive quite all of the pre-tax proﬁts. However, the private
sector becomes increasingly important, in part because of a steady push towards selling
oﬀ control over ﬁrms owned by local governments. After a sale occurs, local governments
20When ﬁrst introduced, expenditures on ﬁxed assets were not permitted as a deduction under the VAT.
Until 2009, the VAT was production-based rather than consumption-based. In addition, all of the local
share of the VAT from a multi-jurisdiction ﬁrm goes to the jurisdiction where the ﬁrm’s headquarters is
located.
21Since 2002, the national government has received corporate income taxes on all new ﬁrms, though
local governments continued to keep corporate taxes from existing local ﬁrms.
15simply receive their share of the taxes collected from these ﬁrms, lowering their incentive
to allocate resources to these ﬁrms.
Another major policy change was to reduce local government’s control over the alloca-
tion of credit from the banking system, so that loans would be made based on commercial
principles. With a commercial market for credit, we then must presume that r becomes
a market clearing price. Overall investment in a jurisdiction no longer depends on the
amount of bank deposits in the jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions will then be net capital
exporters and others net capital importers, leading to a more eﬃcient allocation of capital
across the national market.
What can we then say about the relative rates of investment in diﬀerent types of
activity? From the government’s perspective, the opportunity cost of investment in a
government-owned ﬁrm is now simply r, so that investment in these ﬁrms continues until
Q
j
K = r. Private ﬁrms would choose to invest until (1−sj)Qi
K = r+κi. Taxes discourage
investment in private ﬁrms, and to an extent, that diﬀers by industry due to variation
in VAT coverage or in implicit tax rates on capital. Investment should therefore fall in a
ﬁrm once it is privatized. Government ﬁrms also have a diﬀerential advantage in sectors
where private ﬁrms face higher tax rates.
Farmers continued to face agricultural taxes, but now can choose how much to invest
and will do so until (1 − σ)FK = r.22 In the earlier period, we forecast that Q
j
K/FK < σ,
assuming r ≈ 0, but now forecast that Q
j
K/FK = 1 − σ. If σ <.5, we then conclude that
capital ﬂows out of government ﬁrms into agriculture following the reforms in 1994. A
yet larger shift in capital toward agriculture should have occurred more recently following
the elimination of taxes on agriculture. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, the share of capital
construction allocated to agriculture rose from 1% in 1994 to around 3.5% by 2001, while
the share of capital construction allocated to industry fell from 70% to 60%. Figure 2
also shows that the numbers of tractors per 100 square kilometers of arable land increased
rapidly after 1994, and the pace acelerated after 2004 when provinces in China started to
reduce and eventually to eliminate agricultural taxes.
When private ﬁrms and farmers are left indiﬀerent to adding more capital, however,
local governments gain from further capital investment, particularly in private ﬁrms, due
to the resulting taxes. They can add to the local capital stock by favoring capital-intensive
over labor-intensive industries. One way to do this is to continue to restrict imports to
the jurisdiction of more capital-intensive products in order to increase demand for local
production in these industries.
With the loss of control over the allocation of capital, the remaining control over the
allocation of land took on greater importance. Due to the rapid rate of growth in industry
and the pressure for large reallocations of land, land allocations became an important
issue.
Rather than allocating land speciﬁcally to one ﬁrm or another, the practice instead
22Insecure use rights to the land, though, may inhibit investments in agriculture.
16has been to auction the land to the highest bidder. The key question is then the amount
of land to remove from agriculture and make available for industrial or residential use.
Given the institutions prevailing since 1994, we then forecast that too much land would
be left in agriculture relative to industry. The excess land in agriculture keeps the auction
price high and means that the required compensation to farmers remains low due to the
resulting low marginal product of land in agriculture.
Due to the restrictions on land available for industry, industrial rents are artiﬁcially
high. As a result, land rents have become a major source of ﬁnance for local governments
in China. UBS economist Tao Wang estimated that the national average extra-budgetary
revenue from land auctions is between 17% and 24% of total local government revenues.23
In coastal cities where property prices have risen sharply since 2003, the contribution of
land sales to local government budgets should be signiﬁcantly higher. This institution is
very much reminiscent of the role of land controls in place in Hong Kong, where again the
government has limited that allocation of land to industrial and residential uses.
The economic reforms also substantially changed the incentives to ﬁnance public ser-
vices. Part of the change was the growing use of user fees to ﬁnance infrastructure as well
as services to households. Many services (e.g., highways) are provided by private ﬁrms, in
principle, ﬁnanced fully by user fees. Since the private sector as a whole loses at the mar-
gin from increased services due to the resulting increases in land rents, local governments
gain from increased services and therefore have an incentive to subsidize private ﬁrms to
provide more services. They can do this by allocating extra land to these private ﬁrms,
generating an additional source of revenue for these ﬁrms.
What can we say about the eﬃciency of spending on Gf? User fees such as road tolls
now equal the after-tax beneﬁt to farmers from the use of public services, e.g., (1−σ)FG =
uf. As seen from equation (2.6), though, allocations are then eﬃcient only if there are
no net eﬀects of the extra public services on land rents. However, any extra services to
agriculture beneﬁt farmers due to the increase in compensation paid for land removed from
agriculture and also beneﬁt the non-agricultural sector through a fall in land rents there.
To that extent, government incentives to provide services to agriculture are insuﬃcient.
The model forecasts that Gh will be provided only if fully ﬁnanced with user fees. The
model omits, though, several complicating factors aﬀecting, in particular, expenditures on
education. For one, more educated workers will be more productive, generating extra VAT
revenue.24 In addition, educated workers may be a complement to capital investments,
beneﬁting oﬃcials by adding to the taxable capital stock in the jurisdiction. Oﬀsetting
these beneﬁts, however, more educated workers may be more likely to leave the jurisdiction,
e.g., going oﬀ to university, lowering the tax base for the jurisdiction. There would then
be stronger incentives to provide education at a price below marginal costs in urban areas,
23Tao Wang, “Understanding Land Transfer and Local Government Debt Problem (in Chinese),”
http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100225/COL174204.asp, accessed on March 9, 2010.
24This extra revenue will show up, though, only when these new workers enter the labor force. Oﬃcials
commonly are reassigned after about three years, and as a result, may ignore most of these beneﬁts.
17where workers are less likely to leave if they receive better education.
3.3 Labor mobility
Contrary to our assumptions above, there is some labor mobility in China, even if mobility
is clearly restricted as seen from the large diﬀerences in wage rates between rural and urban
and between inland and coastal residents. Oﬃcially, individuals need to change their hukou
in order to move, requiring approval of both the new jurisdiction and the old jurisdiction.
Mobility therefore requires that the worker as well as both jurisdictions beneﬁt. For a move
to beneﬁt both jurisdictions, side payments between the two jurisdictions will normally
be needed. However, we often see jurisdictions allowing migrant workers to enter without
granting them oﬃcial residence.25 Without oﬃcial residence, however, migrants are not
eligible for public services. Our aim in this section is to understand the implications of
labor mobility for government incentives.26
To begin with, what net beneﬁts does a jurisdiction receive from having workers enter,
and to what degree does the answer depend on the skill level of the worker and whether the
worker is given hukou status? Making use of expression (2.1), we can calculate the impact
on a jurisdiction from a marginal increase in the number of workers. The net beneﬁts/costs
of having an extra worker consist of several components. First, the extra output increases
sales tax revenue. Second, the extra labor force will generate further capital investment,
leading to extra tax revenue both directly due to the implicit tax on capital and indirectly
through further increases in sales tax revenue. Third, land rents change: Industrial land
rents go up due to the increases in both capital and labor, residential land rents increase
due to the larger industrial labor force, but the compensation that must be paid to farmers
for any further land taken out of agriculture also goes up since the value of agricultural
land increases. Fourth, the new worker must be provided public services, but pays any
associated user fees. If user fees do not cover the full cost of services, reﬂecting for example
the pressures from the national government to provide free education, then the jurisdiction
loses to the extent that the worker needs such services. The demand for services is reduced
substantially if the worker is not allowed to shift hukou to the jurisdiction.
The size of these net gains will vary by jurisdiction and by type of worker for a variety
of reasons. The gain in sales tax revenue depends on the industrial composition of the
jurisdiction. For example, if the jurisdiction is mainly agricultural, then their gains are
small given that agriculture is no longer taxed. The gain is also larger in jurisdictions
with a high local wage rate, since then the marginal product of labor is higher, leading to
larger increases in sales tax revenue. The increase in capital investment would normally
be larger the more capital intensive the key industries in the jurisdiction are. Capital
25Many coastal provinces in China are home to millions of migrant workers from inland provinces who
hold only temporary residency permits.
26There are in fact experiments under way at the time of the writing of this paper investigating the
economic implications of easing migration restrictions.
18intensity should be higher in part when the local wage rate is higher. To the extent that
capital and skilled labor are complements, then skilled labor attracts more capital, leading
to a greater increase in tax revenue from capital. The increase in industrial land rents
would normally be greater the larger the increase in capital and labor, while the higher
compensation to farmers for their land is less important in more urban jurisdictions.
What migration do we then expect to see? Workers will want to move to jurisdic-
tions that provide them higher utility. We assume that their utility can be expressed by
U(w,q,Gh,u): Utility should be increasing in the wage rate, falling due to higher land
prices, and higher when the package of public services and user fees is more attractive. In
order to attract workers, a jurisdiction faces an incentive to provide cheaper housing and
more attractive public services. To the extent that communities gain from extra workers,
competition can force down the price of public services and housing below the values we
forecast above.
When will the old and new jurisdictions together agree to shift the migrant’s hukou?
Without a change in hukou, the old jurisdiction normally loses from the migration. Con-
sequently, with unrestricted migration, the resulting rate of migration can be excessive
since neither the migrant nor the new jurisdiction takes these losses to the previous juris-
diction into account. If the previous jurisdiction does not receive compensation, though,
jurisdictions that are threatened with a loss of residents can create barriers to migration,
for example making it diﬃcult to transfer agricultural land.
The new jurisdiction per se has an incentive to avoid making a side payment to the old
jurisdiction. Only migrants who receive a change in hukou are eligible for public services,
providing a further incentive on the new jurisdiction not to seek to change the worker’s
hukou. However, without a change in hukou, workers face a higher implicit price for public
services, perhaps because their best option is to leave their family in their old jurisdiction
where services continue to be available. Because of these higher costs, workers would be
willing to migrate only if other aspects of the new location are more attractive, e.g., wage
rates are higher. Given the added costs beyond the marginal costs of the services when the
family is divided between two locations, there should be a feasible agreement between the
two jurisdictions to change the worker’s hukou. This agreement may even involve the old
jurisdiction compensating the new one for the provision of public services to the worker’s
family. This pressure to change hukou status is limited though if the migrants do not
place much value on the resulting public services, compared to the cost of these services.
We have heard anecdotes of jurisdictions trying to prevent entry of unskilled workers.
Why might this be? Industries vary in their relative demands for skilled versus unskilled
workers. The industrial composition of the jurisdiction should then in equilibrium adjust
so that demands for diﬀerent skill levels match supplies. Given that some industries pay
more in taxes than others, a jurisdiction would then want to adjust the skill composition of
its labor force to match the desired skill composition of the more heavily taxed industries.
If skill-intensive industries are more heavily taxed, as seems plausible, then jurisdictions
have an incentive to increase the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, by preventing the
19in-migration of unskilled workers. For example, the government of Zhongshan, a city
in Guangzhou province, started to implement a scoring system to screen non-resident
applicants. The system assigns 80 points for a college degree, 90 points for a graduate
degree, 10 points for owning property in the city, and one point for each 50,000 yuan
investment in the city for up to 10 points. The city government would oﬀer a migrant
worker and his dependents basic medical care if he has a cumulative score at or above 60,
job training if his score reaches 70, equal access to public services that hukou-holders are
entitled to if his score reaches 90, and hukou if he accumulates a score of 100 or above.
The scoring system makes transparent the preference of the local government for migrant
workers.
4 Incentives generated by promotion and retention proce-
dures
Another important source of incentives for local oﬃcials in China arises from the implica-
tions of their performance for possible promotion to higher positions, or possible demotion
(or worse). The national government attempts to regulate directly the behavior of local
oﬃcials, compensating for the poor ﬁnancial incentives faced by local oﬃcials by retaining
some elements of centralized allocations.
Current interventions by the national government take many forms. For one, the
national government has ruled that local governments are obliged to provide free education
through grade nine. We found above, though, that providing such free education is against
the interests of local oﬃcials. Given the diﬃculties faced by the national government in
keeping tabs on a huge country, any such attempts at oversight will likely have only
modest eﬀect.27 Given this problem, the national government more recently has provided
additional national funds to help free students of any remaining fees for education up
through grade nine, requiring that local governments provide matching funds of their own
for this purpose. Our model forecasts, though, that local oﬃcials have an incentive to
provide education only if the resulting fees fully cover the cost. They have no incentive
to provide a free education even when the national government ﬁnances a fraction of the
costs.
Over time, the national government has made increasingly explicit its mechanism for
judging the qualiﬁcations of local oﬃcials for possible promotion: Judgments will be based
in good part on the rate of growth in national tax revenue from the jurisdiction. The
preferences of other top oﬃcials in the jurisdiction are also taken into account. How do
these added incentives aﬀect our prior results?
Previously, the objectives of oﬃcials reﬂected the ﬁscal proﬁts they controlled while in
oﬃce. National promotion policies induce oﬃcials to give some weight as well to national
27For example, education can be free of tuition, but there can be many fees imposed (for uniforms,
books, etc.).
20tax revenue. The national government collects 75% of the overall VAT payments, increas-
ing the importance of sales tax revenue. They collect all of the corporate tax revenue from
new ﬁrms and from state ﬁrms, tending to equalize the incentives local oﬃcials face to aid
one category of ﬁrm compared to another. The national government, though, does not
collect any revenue from agriculture, so the added incentives increase the weight placed on
industry compared with agriculture. Since the VAT does not allow deductions for capital,
promotion incentives create yet more of an incentive to favor capital-intensive industries
over other sectors.
Having promotion decisions depend on the preferences of other top oﬃcials in the
jurisdiction helps address any agency problems in the jurisdiction. In a hierarchical struc-
ture, oﬃcials at any given level in the hierarchy require the support of those in the next
lower level. Given these links at each level of the hierarchy, even the top oﬃcial implicitly
needs to worry about the preferences of the lowest ranked oﬃcials. While leading to an
alignment of interests among all oﬃcials, though, this structure does not in itself create
any reason to care about the welfare of non-oﬃcials, supporting our omitting the utility
of residents from the objective function for local government oﬃcials.
The national government also aﬀects the incentives faced by local governments through
its control over the allocation of intergovenmental transfers of funds. Funds are in part
allocated based on geography, going particularly to inland provinces. Since residents lose
access to any beneﬁts resulting from these transfers if they leave the jurisdiction, these
transfers result in less migration of workers from inland regions that receive greater per
capita transfers. Since we forecast excessive migration previously, transfers can then help
ease the resulting misallocations.
5 Alternative policies and the resulting incentives for local
oﬃcials
Since promotion standards and centralized allocations of funding cannot easily be tailored
to local conditions, these interventions inevitably lead to misallocations. The interven-
tions may still improve on outcomes to the extent that local oﬃcials face poorly designed
ﬁnancial incentives. To the degree that ﬁnancial incentives were altered so as to lead to
more eﬃcient decentralized allocations, the central government would face less pressure
to intervene directly. How then would the ineﬃciencies generated by current sources of
ﬁnance for local governments be aﬀected by plausible changes in the tax structure?
Under existing incentives faced by oﬃcials, outcomes are ineﬃcient on many dimen-
sions. Governments make use of their controls over the allocation of land to keep prices
high for industrial and residential uses, and low for agriculture. Since any movement of
resources from agriculture to industry generates more tax revenue, oﬃcials will make use
of their control over public services and regulations to aid industry relative to agriculture.
They will make use of their regulatory powers to favor more highly taxed (often the more
21capital-intensive) local industries. To ﬁnance public services with user fees, the required
fee must equal the average cost of the service per user in order to break even. But the ser-
vice is used eﬃciently only if the fee also equals the marginal cost per user. High tolls on
the roads, for example, unduly discourage usage. Migration of workers is limited, leading
to dramatic diﬀerences in wage rates across locations, suggesting large ineﬃciencies from
the misallocation of workers. Along each dimension, what policy changes might lead to
more eﬃcient decentralized allocations?
Taxes avoid favoring one industry over another, for a given local population, only if the
taxes collected are the same for each worker, regardless of the industry in which a worker
is employed. This equalization of taxes paid per worker would exist under a variety of al-
ternative tax structures. In principle, it arises with a consumption-based VAT, since here
taxes paid depend on each worker’s consumption expenditures but not on the industry
where they are employed.28 A retail sales tax creates equivalent incentives, but also can
have a high evasion rate due to the many small retail ﬁrms that are hard to monitor and
due to the ease of cross-border shopping. A third alternative is to conﬁne such a consump-
tion tax to those goods that can easily be monitored, including for example residential
housing, ownership of a car, and a range of other goods such as electricity consumption
and phone usage. Diﬀerential rates by form of consumption induce a misallocation of
consumption across commodities, but the eﬃciency costs here are normally second-order.
Under these alternative tax bases, revenue does not depend on the industry in which a
worker is employed. Revenue also increases as income per capita and the population in the
jurisdiction rise, giving oﬃcials an incentive to raise per capita income and to attract new
residents. For these reasons, it is not surprising that the principal sources of tax revenue
among local governments in the United States are a property tax and a local retail sales
tax (that covers in practice around a third of overall consumption).
What policy alternatives might lead to a more eﬃcient allocation of land? Since
oﬃcials are compensated heavily based on the price diﬀerential of land in alternative
uses, they face strong incentives to shift land to higher-value uses. Oﬃcials shift land too
slowly on eﬃciency grounds to take advantage of their market power. However, due to
the turnover of oﬃcials, each generation of oﬃcial will choose to transfer additional land
to higher-value uses. As long as this transfer occurs through a sale rather than a lease of
land, the resulting drop in rents on inframarginal units sold by previous oﬃcials is borne
by past buyers rather than by the government. According to equation (2.4), allocations
therefore converge towards one with Q
j
A = Qi
A = FA as the additional transfers by each
generation of oﬃcial (A0
f − Af) converge toward zero. Misallocation of land therefore
seems to be primarily a transition problem in the absence of any mechanism through
which diﬀerent generations of oﬃcials could collude, acting as if there were one oﬃcial in
28In practice, though, a consumption-based VAT is hard to enforce, since it is very diﬃcult to monitor
the ﬂow of goods into and out of the jurisdiction.. It would also be diﬃcult to monitor trade within a
multi-jurisdictional ﬁrm, given the use of transfer pricing.
22oﬃce indeﬁnitely.29
One other current source of ineﬃciency arises from the high user fees for public services.
When the average cost exceeds the marginal cost for a service, as should be the case for
highways, for example, then the services are underutilized. Even when the marginal and
average costs are equal, as could be true for education, users may face binding liquidity
constraints that prevent them for undertaking an investment in human capital even if the
eventual rate of return is very high. As seen above, though, oﬃcials have no incentive to
provide these services unless doing so generates enough extra revenue to cover the costs.
What alternatives exist? Mobility is the mechanism emphasized in the Tiebout model
to induce oﬃcials to provide the eﬃcient level and composition of services. To the extent
people are mobile, oﬃcials are pressed to adopt policies that attract potential residents and
induce existing residents to stay. With intense competition, policies end up maximizing
the utility of residents and are eﬃcient. To attract additional residents, the key means
available to oﬃcials is to reduce the price and increase the quality of public services. The
residual costs of the extra public services can then be ﬁnanced out of the other taxes paid
by the new residents.
A natural fear if restrictions on mobility are relaxed is that cities with high wages will
quickly develop shanty-towns on their periphery. To some degree this occurs already, due
to the temporary residents who lack hukou status. An alternative to the hukou procedure
for limiting the population of a city is to restrict residence to those who own or have signed
a lease for a registered housing unit in the city, and perhaps meet occupancy restrictions
(number of people per square meter). People can then move freely, and property values
adjust as jurisdictions become more or less attractive. Competition among jurisdictions for
residents still creates incentives on oﬃcials to provide higher quality public services, even
if the population remains unchanged, since a more attractive jurisdiction attracts higher
income residents, who consume more and so pay more in consumption taxes. Property
values also rise, leading to greater property tax payments.
One factor inhibiting mobility is the lack of a market for farmland. Those working in
agriculture then face the potential loss of much of the value of this use-right to the land
if they migrate. Only if the utility gain is large enough, given these hurdles, will those
currently working in agriculture move. With easier transfers of use rights, there would
be greater mobility and more pressure on oﬃcials to provide the eﬃcient level of public
services.
29However, as we discussed earlier, a policy of the central government that preserves at least 1.8 billion
mu of agricultural land could be serving as a means of collusion among diﬀerent generations of oﬃcials to
keep the value of non-agricultural land permanently higher than agricultural land.
236 Conclusions
The Chinese economy has beneﬁted dramatically from the decentralization of decision-
making to individual ﬁrms and workers, regarding what to produce, how to organize
production, and where to work. The question focused on in this paper is the feasibility
of an equivalent decentralization within the government. China, like the United States,
has a federal system of government, with national, provincial, county, municipal, and
village levels of government. Given the huge size and diversity of the country, it is diﬃcult
for the national government to make allocation decisions for all of these diﬀerent levels of
government, just as it was diﬃcult for the national government to make allocation decisions
for all of the many ﬁrms in the economy. To what degree can decentralized decision-making
within the government lead to more eﬃcient outcomes? This can occur only to the degree
that the economic incentives faced by local oﬃcials are designed appropriately.
In this paper, we examined the economic incentives faced by local oﬃcials in China
over the course of the economic reforms. In doing so, we made use of a number of the
standard presumptions in the Tiebout model. In particular, we assumed that local oﬃcials
beneﬁt from the tax revenue received by their jurisdiction plus any income from renting
or selling land minus the costs of public services. Given these ﬁnancial incentives, what
allocation decisions do we expect local oﬃcials to make? The behavior of local oﬃcials
forecast by the model, to our mind, corresponds closely to the stylized facts we see in the
data. If we accept this model as a valid characterization for how oﬃcials behave, then
the model provides a mechanism to help guide the redesign of these incentives in order
to induce oﬃcials to allocate resources more eﬃciently. Potential reforms were discussed
brieﬂy, though many others may also reduce the ineﬃciencies that result under current
incentives.
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29Table 2: Tax and Non-Tax Revenues as Percentages of GDP, 1978-2007. The tax and
non-tax items listed in the table are incomplete. We selected a few items that are relevent
to our discussion in the paper. The sum of the parts is therefore smaller than the total.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Tax Revenue Non-Tax Revenue
Industrial Corporate Remitted
Tax Commercial Agricultural Income SOE Subsidies Education
Year Total Revenue Tax Tax Tax Proﬁts to SOEs Fee
1978 31.1 14.2 12.7 0.8 15.7
1980 25.5 12.6 11.2 0.6 9.6
1982 22.8 13.1 11.7 0.6 5.6
1984 22.8 13.1 11.2 0.5 3.8
1985 22.2 22.6 12.2 0.5 7.7 0.5 -5.6
1986 20.7 20.3 11.7 0.4 6.7 0.4 -3.2
1987 18.2 17.7 10.6 0.4 5.5 0.4 -3.1
1988 15.7 15.9 9.9 0.5 4.5 0.3 -3.0
1989 15.7 16.1 10.4 0.5 4.1 0.4 -3.5
1990 15.7 15.1 10.0 0.5 3.8 0.4 -3.1
1991 14.5 13.7 9.1 0.4 3.4 0.3 -2.3 0.1
1992 12.9 12.2 8.3 0.4 2.7 0.2 -1.7 0.1
1993 12.3 12.0 9.0 0.4 1.9 0.1 -1.2 0.1
1994 10.8 10.6 8.1 0.5 1.5 -0.8 0.1
1995 10.3 9.9 7.5 0.5 1.4 -0.5 0.1
1996 10.4 9.7 7.4 0.5 1.4 -0.5 0.1
1997 11.0 10.4 0.5 1.2 -0.5 0.1
1998 11.7 11.0 0.5 1.1 -0.4 0.1
1999 12.8 11.9 0.5 0.9 -0.3 0.1
2000 13.5 12.7 0.5 1.0 -0.3 0.1
2001 14.9 14.0 0.4 2.4 -0.3 0.2
2002 15.7 14.7 0.6 2.6 -0.2 0.2
2003 16.0 14.7 0.6 2.1 -0.2 0.2
2004 16.5 15.1 0.6 2.5 -0.1 0.2
2005 17.3 15.7 0.5 2.9 -0.1 0.2
2006 18.3 16.4 0.5 3.3 -0.1 0.2






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 4: Local Government Budgetary Expeditures by Selected Programs, as Percent-
ages of Total Budgetary Expenditures. Source: China Statistics Yearbook 2007, National
Bureau of Statistics of China.
Services to
Culture, Industry
Capital Eduation, Communications Social Social
Year Construction Agriculture Science Education & Distribution Subsidies Insurance
1991 8.46 9.61 27.19 16.26 1.63 2.91
1992 8.7 9.39 27.3 15.97 1.72 2.56
1993 8.47 8.74 25.65 15.34 1.57 2.24
1994 7.26 8.78 28.22 17.5 1.58 2.33
1995 8.51 7.95 27.34 16.99 1.42 2.37
1996 8.8 7.87 26.66 16.61 1.44 2.19
1997 8.72 7.53 25.63 15.75 1.44 2.1
1998 10.14 7.26 24.93 15.83 0.98 2.15 1.77
1999 11.75 6.74 23.8 15.44 0.97 1.97 3.6
2000 10.54 6.65 23.64 15.67 1.04 2.03 5.33
2001 12.54 6.23 22.85 15.5 1.06 2.02 5.69
2002 12.37 6.43 23.11 15.93 1.08 2.42 6.29
2003 11.07 5.8 23.2 15.65 1.16 2.87 6.49
2004 10.17 7.54 22.45 15.28 1.35 2.7 6.45
2005 10.64 6.54 21.93 14.83 1.4 2.83 6.28
2006 9.55 6.46 22.04 14.74 1.47 2.96 6.19
32